When questioning whether living beings have free-will, the first thing we must consider is that all living beings, or in this case, humans who are aware of their consciousness, are bound by the laws of causality, space, and time. Specifically, by comprehending these three facts and concepts, we can at least recognize that, in absolute terms, human actions are not free. Second, there are physical and biological limitations — universally, no human can surpass their biological limits, and no human is physically capable of performing actions beyond their physical reach.
So, where exactly did the concept of free will originate, and why is it still debated from the perspectives of science, philosophy, and religion? From the standpoint of philosophy, the concept of free will was implicitly examined by two Greek pillars (Plato and Aristotle). Plato’s Dualism raises queries about the relationship between the material (body) and the ideal form (immaterial), while Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover posits that all actions must have a primary cause that sets them in motion. As we move into Christian theology, the idea of free will is clearly grounded in the belief that human existence and actions are part of the creation process, or, in other words, everything that moves is a creation.
Through a literature review, we explicitly find that the concept of free will exists because we reflect our existence and our relationship with a supreme being. God attributes, according to religious doctrine, often intervene in human life. Therefore, in my view, the issue of free will as a whole becomes difficult when mixed with divine concepts because the attributes of God and the limitations of humans often trap us in an ontological gap. This gap arises when attempting to reconcile human actions as independent yet also part of God’s creation from a religious perspective.
In my opinion, it is clear from a mechanistic and bodily function standpoint that humans do not possess free will, at least as understood through the concept of deterministic causality. Our existence is clearly the result of prior causes — biologically, we are the offspring of our parents. Furthermore, when we reflect on our actions, which are confined by space and time, humans are absolutely not free; no human can fully surpass or escape the laws of space and time. From an epistemological perspective, while humans do have metacognition — the capacity for self-reflection, which distinguishes us from animals — our thoughts and actions are still influenced by our presuppositions. Even when we are given choices, we are influenced by our predispositions towards certain objects. For example, our preference for a certain color can affect our choices. We generate no completely new thoughts. We think about what we already know and repeat those thoughts. It’s all repetitive.
In a previous article, I discussed how free will is determined by a set of free wills. In short, from the perspective of the stream of consciousness, our attachment to the environment, biological predispositions, and social dynamics play a significant role in shaping our psychology. Specifically, from a phenomenological perspective, our choices are inherently part of the consequences of specific causes. For instance, throughout life, we encounter different color choices, and the color we choose may eventually become our new favorite. It’s important to highlight two things: first, that an individual’s color choice is heavily influenced by psychological causality, and second, that the color we choose is part of a causal chain. For example, mixing white and red will inevitably produce a new color, pink. Many aspects of human life are governed by causality, which applies to all areas of our existence. Consequently, our choices are subject to this causal framework and eventually become presuppositions that influence our future interactions.
In conclusion, within a materialistic framework, it is transparent that humans do not have free will. Our attachment to the set of causes and the laws of space and time makes it clear that physically, biologically, and mentally, we are not free. The issue with free will, however, arises from the relationship between humans and religious doctrine — specifically, the relationship between humans and God, which to this day (and possibly forever) creates an ontological gap. Nevertheless, it is peculiar to contemplate the relationship between free will and our consciousness. As I explained earlier, humans are bound by the laws of causality, space, and time, yet on the other hand, with our consciousness, we also consciously challenge concepts beyond space and time. This raises a deeper ontological issue: is our consciousness free or constrained by these laws?
